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Abstract—The paper is focussed on remote, sometimes de-
noted by e-laboratories and their security. In the introduc-
tion the basic features, working principles and state of the 
art of this new ICT teaching tool are described. The main 
topic of the paper is a new and emerging issue of the safety 
and security of e-laboratories, whose safety measures are 
often inadequate. For easy-to-follow purposes e-laboratories 
are divided into three working groups according to their 
complexity. The analysis of potential risks that may occur in 
both hardware and software side are presented and possible 
precautions to eliminate these risks are given. As an exam-
ple the measures, taken in our e-laboratories (in Prague 
http://www.ises.info, Zlin and Trnava http://kf.truni.sk/ 
remotelab) are mentioned. 
Index Terms—Remote experiments, remote laboratories, 
security of remote experiments. 
I. REMOTE LABORATORIES – STATE OF THE ART 
The contemporary society is characterized by growing 
virtualization and sharing of resources and assets through 
the Internet. This approach saves the cost of expensive 
shared devices, available through the network. This trend 
can be found in a wide range of sectors of human activi-
ties in general and in teaching process in particular. 
Teaching of natural sciences is no exception. A great deal 
of attention worldwide has been devoted to e-laboratories 
offering access to various real world remote experiments 
(REs) [1-4]. The ultimate goals in forming teaching sup-
port for a teacher are grids of remote laboratories and their 
integration into a cloud-system with an easy data pro-
cessing and storing. 
Only recently has emerged a serious problem stemming 
from security aspects of e-laboratories. As the chain is 
always as strong as its weakest link, it is necessary to start 
from the security of basic constituent of the system and 
we will describe the security precautions of the remote 
experiment (RE) itself. The RE is actually a real experi-
ment running in a real laboratory by using real instruments 
and equipment. It can be controlled by a teacher, student 
or any other user from his/her computer through the Inter-
net on the general controlling scheme of server-client. 
Controlling of the experiments is enabled via Web inter-
face, by means of which the user can perform the appro-
priate settings, options, and starting or stopping the exper-
iment. The measured data from the experiment are trans-
ferred across the Internet and presented through the web 
interface to the client. Web page may include the option to 
export data directly into one of the spreadsheets editor 
(most often Microsoft Excel) for easy processing. Most of 
the experiments include the Web camera that allows 
monitoring the ongoing experiment in real time and/or 
communication with the instructor. Schematic arrange-
ment of the remote experiment is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Schematical arrangement of the remote experiment 
Such experiments are mainly designed under the auspi-
ces of the universities for the purpose of teaching. For this 
reason usage of some of them is only for students of the 
university in question and access is secured by the user 
name and password (especially at American universities). 
In Europe and Australia several projects exist supporting 
building of open remote laboratories - with free access, 
either with or without registration. Some labs offer to 
insert client´s initials (name, country, e-mail) for volun-
tary statistical purposes. With necessary exceptions 
(maintenance, modification, technical issues...) experi-
ments are accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a week 
[5-6].  
REs can be divided according to many criteria. One of 
them is their sophistication and complexity of physical 
hardware they use. From this viewpoint, experiments can 
be divided into three categories as the security hazards: 
a) Basic REs, which do not use complex devices and 
are used for logging the data from detecting probe and/or 
for retrieving stored data from the experiment. The clients 
cannot interact with the experiment (in some cases, he/she 
can only start or stop the data logging) or affect it in any 
way. In this case one-way data transfer takes place from 
physical hardware to the client. Classical representatives 
of this category are weather stations giving the client the 
access to the logged data (the temperature, pressure, sun-
light intensity or radioactive background). (See Czech 
laboratory www.ises.info and their environment monitor-
ing at http://kdt-16.karlov.mff.cuni.cz/en/mereni.html or 
Slovak laboratory http://remotelab1.truni.sk).  
b) Complex REs: These REs require two-way commu-
nication between a client and the server. The user sends 
control commands to the server and receives the confirm-
ing of the request and measured data. As an example we 
can give the Electrochemical cell characterization experi-
ment, where the user can control the electrolyte volume 
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and concentration in the electrochemical cell (see: 
http://remotelab2.truni.sk).  
c) The last category of REs are scientific experiments, 
very often based on a commercial apparatus controlled by 
the authoring SW, delivered by the producer, and used for 
the remote controlling. Additional services provided by 
sophisticated experiments are their cooperative features; 
instruments sharing and their use reserving. Especially 
these REs are susceptible to many hazards and damages. 
Instrumentation is usually based on expensive equipment 
susceptible to damage and strict rules of exploitation for 
the control of experiment have to be observed and REs 
have to be secured against all possible breaching of these 
rules of instrument exploitation. Controlling of astronomi-
cal telescope may be an example of this category (see: 
http://my.telescope.org/index.php).  
It is worth mentioning that unreliable or malfunctioning 
RE may cause the ill “psychological” effect, especially on 
newcomers in the field, about the usefulness of this new 
and prospective teaching and scientific tool [4]. 
In the light of the maturity of e-laboratories and their 
importance, it is surprising how a little attention has been 
devoted to the security risks of REs and e-laboratories. 
We want to contribute to this acute field by this paper and 
describe the risks of security to remote laboratories in 
general and our first experience with security in our re-
mote laboratories. 
II. THE GENERAL SECURITY RISKS OF REMOTE 
EXPERIMENTS 
Let us discuss first the general aspects of security that 
applies to all REs. These aspects can be divided according 
to the different constituent parts of a RE depicted in Fig-
ure 2. RE always consists of the physical hardware, in-
formatics hardware and informatics software. Let's now 
look at the security risks of these individual parts of the 
RE. To these risks we add aspect of the environment that 
can affect the experiment and cannot be easily eliminated. 
Physical and Informatics hardware security aspect: As 
the name suggests, this category includes deliberate dam-
age of the physical hardware of the experiment. This as-
pect is in the most cases given by situating the experiment 
in a building and a locked room. Adequate and regular 
inspection and maintenance of the RE equipment is a 
stringent and often underestimated condition for the run-
ning of the e-laboratory. The REs hardware can also be 
damaged through the fault or mishandling by the client 
controlling the RE. All these circumstances should have 
been attended to in the controlling RE program.  
Informatics (RE) software security aspect: This is an at-
tack to the experiment via informatics software mostly 
across the Internet. This aspect will be described later. 
Security aspect due to environment: This category in-
cludes failure of the power supply (power outages, voltage 
spikes and surges). The security level of this aspect is of 
course dependent on the cost of the experiment. Surge 
protection and circuit breakers are usually adequate secu-
rity for simple experiments. But the experiments using 
expensive measuring devices require a comprehensive 
security via UPS sources. 
A. Software risks of remote laboratories 
The main problem of the REs is the remote access from 
anywhere via the Internet.  To make this thing feasible  the  
 
Figure 2.  Schematical representation of the remote experiment [8] 
 
Figure 3.  Breakdown of attacked sites by areas of activity – the second 
half of 2011[9] 
server, on which the experiment runs, must have a public 
IP address. With this requirement comes a whole range of 
security risks. Public IP address allows finding and at-
tempting to connect to the server to potential unauthorized 
attackers. The attacks on the servers are not an infrequent 
phenomenon on the Internet. There are many different 
types of attacks which threaten the functionality of web 
servers. Recently we have encountered the so-called 
DDoS type of the most powerful attack in the media. 
Report of Kaspersky Lab brings the statistics of the targets 
of DDoS attacks in the second half of 2011[9] (Fig. 3). 
We can see the most attacks were directed at commercial 
sites such as online stores (25%) and trading sites (20%). 
Actually the attacks on the RE were in 2011 not an acute 
problem , but it may easily aggravate when remote labora-
tories become a wide spread tool of experimentation at 
schools and universities. Figure 4 shows the most used 
types of DDoS attacks. 
Next, we will describe typical representatives and func-
tionality of DDoS attacks and few other basic types of 
attacks one might encounter. To the most often encoun-
tered and obvious security risk belong: 
Attempt to connect using RDP, WMI, and FTP. Access 
to the server allows direct possibility to control of the 
experiment lading to the damage of the experiment. 
Denial-of-service attack - (DoS attack) is an attempt to 
make a computer or network resource unavailable to its 
intended users. Although the means to carry out, motives 
for, and targets of a DoS attack may vary, it generally 
consists of the concerted efforts of a person, or multiple 
people to prevent an Internet site or service from function-
ing efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely. [10]  
Distributed Denial of Service - refers to a variant of 
DoS attacks where attacks not come only from one com-
puter, but from a large number of parallel channels. It 
means that there are tens, hundreds and even thousands of 
stations which are involved into attack. Owners of these 
computers do not know about involving theirs computer 
into attack. It is possible because of malicious software 
(called zombies), which are installed on their systems. 
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Figure 4.  Types of DDoS attacks – the second half of 2011[14] 
ICMP flood - Ping of death - (abbreviated "POD") is a 
type of attack on a computer that involves sending a mal-
formed or otherwise malicious ping to a computer. A ping 
is normally 32 bytes in size (or 84 bytes when the Internet 
Protocol (IP) header is considered); historically, many 
computer systems could not handle a ping packet larger 
than the maximum IPv4 packet size, which is 65,535 
bytes. Sending a ping of this size could crash the target 
computer.[11] 
ICMP flood - Smurf attack - is one particular variant of 
a flooding DoS attack on the public Internet. It relies on 
misconfigured network devices that allow packets to be 
sent to all computer hosts on a particular network via the 
broadcast address of the network, rather than a specific 
machine. The network then serves as a smurf amplifier. In 
such an attack, the perpetrators will send large numbers of 
IP packets with the source address faked to appear to be 
the address of the victim. The network's bandwidth is 
quickly used up, preventing legitimate packets from get-
ting through to their destination. To combat Denial of 
Service attacks on the Internet, services like the Smurf 
Amplifier Registry have given network service providers 
the ability to identify misconfigured networks and to take 
appropriate action such as filtering.[12] 
SYN flood - is a form of denial-of-service attack in 
which an attacker sends a succession of SYN requests to a 
target's system in an attempt to consume enough server 
resources to make the system unresponsive to legitimate 
traffic. This attack is based on how TCP / IP connection is 
established. It normally works like this: An application 
that initiates the session sends SYN packet synchroniza-
tion recipients. The recipient sends back a confirmation 
packet to the TCP SYN-ACK, the initiator responds by 
confirmation packet ACK. When a SYN attack hacker 
floods the target system by series of TCP SYN packets. 
Each packet causes the target system to sends SYN ACK 
response. While the target system waits for an ACK, in-
serts all outstanding SYN-ACK response to the queue. 
When the queue is full, the system will ignore all incom-
ing SYN requests. [13] 
UDP flood - UDP Flood Attack is one of the attacks 
causing host based Denial of Service. UDP is a connec-
tionless protocol and it does not require any connection 
setup procedure to transfer data. A UDP Flood Attack is 
possible when an attacker sends a UDP packet to a ran-
dom port on the victim system. When the victim system 
receives a UDP packet, it will determine what application 
is waiting on the destination port. When it realizes that 
there is no application that is waiting on the port, it will 
generate an ICMP packet of destination unreachable to the 
forged source address. If enough UDP packets are deliv-
ered to ports on victim, the system will go down. [14] 
HTTP flood - HTTP Flood remains the most popular 
type of attack (80%). It involves simultaneously sending a 
large number of HTTP requests to the site being attacked. 
Cybercriminals use several different technologies to con-
duct this type of attack. In 55% of all HTTP Flood attacks 
bots try to access a single page of the site. The second 
most common type (22%) is attacks on various authoriza-
tion forms. The third most common type (12%) is attacks 
that involve numerous attempts to download a file from 
the site. More sophisticated attacks, in which cybercrimi-
nals attempt to mask the bots by imitating the behavior of 
real users, are conducted in only 10% of all cases. [9] 
Fake identity - For more complex experiments the fake 
identity may lead to direct access to the control of experi-
ment. It can lead to damage of the experiment. 
B. Consequences of software attacks on remote 
laboratories 
From the division of REs it is obvious that the security 
requirements of the three groups of REs differ with re-
spect to their functionality. All attacks on REs can lead to 
a controlled shutdown of RE (in a better case) or to an 
undefined state of RE (in the worse case) and therefore 
they call for some security precautions. Security measures 
depend on the type of experiment. 
Basic REs: Attack on basic REs may lead to shutdown 
of the server thus preventing their proper use (Fig. 5). 
Because it is simple experiments that run without user 
intervention and do not allow any control, attack on them 
will not cause any further damage. Basic securities and 
outsourcing using remote access is the remedy in this 
case. 
Complex REs: As in the previous case the attack may 
lead to the server shutdown and therefore unavailability of 
the experiment. Due to the sophisticated physical HW 
involved with the rather sophisticated control program 
(informatics SW), there is another risk. The hacker can 
cause damage of controlling software and in extreme 
cases even hardware component parts of the experiment 
by attacking the server. When the hacker takes over the 
control of the server, he/she can send malicious com-
mands which may lead to damage of the experiment (Fig. 
6). As an example we can mention "water level control 
experiment" (http://195.178.94.32/) when the overwriting 
of controlling limits can lead to overflow the tank. If the 
experiment is not secured against this possibility, it could 
cause flooding, short-circuiting of electronics and even a 
fire. 
Scientific REs: Attack on these experiments involves 
the risks mentioned for the previous two groups. The risk 
with scientific REs is enhanced by the cost of the used 
sophisticated measuring instruments whose price may soar 
 
Figure 5.  Scheme of attack to the basic experiments 
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Figure 6.  Scheme of attack to the complex experiments 
 
Figure 7.  Scheme of attack to the scientific experiment 
to millions. Damaging of such devices, either only soft-
ware part or even hardware can cause extensive damages. 
Because of this, these experiments require the best care 
and security for all possible disturbances due to external 
interference. Some of these experiments can be controlled 
directly. It means that the user sends controlling com-
mands directly to the experiment. It creates another securi-
ty risk, because hacker can fake the identity of the author-
ized user. In this case, he can send malicious commands 
which may damage experiment (Fig. 7). 
III. DESIGN OF SPECIFIC SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
The following sections will be concerned with security 
protection of REs against software attacks from outside. 
Again, as mentioned above, the level of security will vary 
depending on the type of experiments sophistication given 
above. 
A. Security of basic remote experiments 
These experiments do not require special security. We 
just have to stick to basic safety rules such as regular 
update of antivirus, system firewall that allows locking 
ports and securing proper system services running. Special 
security of server or secured access to the experiment 
would be costly due to the nature of the experiment. The 
least precaution should be the warning that the experiment 
is out of function and under repair. Generally the control-
ling SW of even simple experiments should have the self 
healing property, i.e. to either restart to the initial starting 
conditions and/or other defined state enabling the continu-
ation of data logging after simple shutdowns resulting 
from blackouts or other interfering influences.  
B. Security of complex remote experiments 
With this group of REs it is important to follow basic 
rules of security as in the previous case. Because this type 
of REs cannot be damaged directly by the control com-
mands it is not necessary to secure the connection against 
eavesdropping or confusion. But we should cover all the 
possible problems arising from the running of the experi-
ment both software and hardware (working with fluid in 
the experiment http://195.178.94.32/ - the experiment is 
placed into the tank where the water cannot drain to the 
electrical devices). If we want to make the experiment 
accessible only for some groups of users it is appropriate 
to arrange the access by the user´s name and password, 
which directly leads to a better security. The biggest po-
tential risk is the access procedure to the server of the 
experiment. Fortunately the attacks to the server can not in 
majority of cases lead to the damage of physical hardware, 
but only to an unavailability of the experiment. As men-
tioned in Introduction, the main ill effect is then the gen-
eral feeling of unreliability of REs as education tool. 
C. Security of scientific remote experiments 
Experiments in this category are characterized by their 
high costs. For this reason, the security of them is of ut-
most importance and it is necessary to devote much effort 
and resources to ensure it. The attack on these experi-
ments can be provided in two ways: 
 
1) Attack to the server (informatics HW)  
Attacks to the server can prevent access to the experi-
ment, which can lead to material losses. Most common 
types of attacks to the server are DoS and DDoS attacks 
with straightforward solutions to this problem: 
-Firewall, switches, and routers - The right choice and 
setting of these devices can prevent basic types of attacks. 
By using mechanisms such as access control list, rate 
limiting, traffic shaping, delayed binding (TCP splicing), 
deep packet inspection and Bogon filtering, DoS attacks 
can be detected and remedied. All these measures work 
only as long as the measures taken aredesigned for DoS 
attacks in question. For example SYN flood can be pre-
vented using delayed binding or TCP splicing. Similarly 
content based DoS can be prevented using deep packet 
inspection. Attacks originating from dark addresses or 
going to dark addresses can be prevented using Bogon 
filtering. However if the attacks are based on a different 
principle, these security systems are ineffective [15]. 
-Application front end hardware - Application front end 
hardware is intelligent hardware placed on the network 
before traffic reaches the servers. It can be used on net-
works in conjunction with routers and switches. Applica-
tion front end hardware analyzes data packets as they 
enter the system, and then identifies them as priority, 
regular, or dangerous. There are more than 25 bandwidth 
management vendors [16]. 
-IPS based prevention - Intrusion-prevention systems 
(IPS) are effective if the attacks have associated signs. 
However, the trend among the attacks is to have legitimate 
content but bad intent. IPS which works on content recog-
nition cannot block behavior-based DoS attacks. An ASIC 
based IPS can detect and block denial of service attacks 
because they have the processing power and the granulari-
ty to analyze the attacks and act like a circuit breaker in an 
automated way [16]. 
-DDS based defense - More focused on the problem 
than IPS, a DoS Defense System (DDS) is able to block 
connection-based DoS attacks and those with legitimate 
content but bad intent. A DDS can also address both pro-
tocol attacks (such as Teardrop and Ping of death) and 
rate-based attacks (such as ICMP floods and SYN floods). 
Like IPS, a purpose-built system, such as the well-known 
Top Layer IPS products, can detect and block denial of 
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service attacks at much nearer line speed than a software 
based system. [17] 
-Clean pipes – Is the service where all traffic is passed 
through a "cleaning center" via a proxy, which separates 
"bad" traffic (DDoS and also other common internet at-
tacks) and only sends good traffic beyond to the server. 
The provider needs central connectivity to the Internet to 
manage this kind of service. Prolexic, Tata Communica-
tions and VeriSign are examples of providers of this ser-
vice. [17] 
Access to the server can also help an attacker to damage 
experiment by sending of malicious control commands 
directly to the device. This problem is already included in 
the most security solutions mentioned above. 
2) Attack to the physical HW 
Another security risk is appearing due to the fact that 
experiments allow direct control by control commands. 
They allow an attacker to attack directly the experiment 
without being influenced by the security measures of the 
server. By sending malicious control commands sophisti-
cated equipment can be damaged and major financial 
losses can be caused. It is obvious that with expensive 
physical HW it is necessary to provide access to the ex-
periment only to authorized users. 
The solution of this problem may be secure access to 
the experiment by using the user ´s name and password. 
However, this may turn out as absolutely insufficient for 
this type of REs. An attacker may use social engineering 
and phishing to gain the access to the data. He/she also 
may change his/her internet identity, i.e. redirect the flow 
of the data to a false computer, to look like an authorized 
user and thus gaining access to the experiment. A good 
remedy is then securing the connection between the server 
and client by using encryption and authentication of the 
identity on both sides. For this purpose you can use differ-
ent types of symmetric and asymmetric encryption. How-
ever the application layer of network protocols offers a 
comprehensive solution of this problem. It is HTTPS 
protocol (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure). [18] 
HTTPS is an extension of the HTTP network protocol, 
which enables secure connection between web browsers 
and web server from eavesdroppers and data-faking. It 
also verifies the identity of the counterparty. HTTPS pro-
tocol uses asymmetric encryption. Both parties have to 
generate a key pair (private and public) before communi-
cation. At the start of communication, both sides exchange 
public keys, which should be checked by a different 
communication channel. 
The encryption protects communications from eaves-
droppers, but without authentication of public keys, there 
are communication risks from a "Man in the middle". This 
issue involves an attacker who intercepts the communica-
tion when establishing a connection. By capturing and 
replacing of the public keys of both counterparties he 
obtains unlimited access to communication and allows 
changing or disrupting communication. Because of that it 
is necessary to solve the problem of handing the keys. 
There are some solutions: 
-The most trusted verification, is handing the keys per-
sonally. This option is applicable for a limited number of 
experiment´s users and the possibility of their meeting. 
-Verification can be done by checking the extract of 
keys (hash) for example by using telephone call. 
-You can also use the principle of "transfer of trust"; 
public key is digitally signed in this case. This signature is 
verified by a certification authority that we trust (e.g. 
VeriSign). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
REs in e-laboratories are becoming modern and pro-
spective trend in teaching at school and university level. 
Unfortunately, along with this come the threats of possible 
attacks. Attacks may vary depending on the type of exper-
iment and the purpose for which they are performed so, 
similarly, the defence also varies. 
Attacks may be directed to the control servers of exper-
iments usually leading to the shutdown of the experiment 
and the impossibility of access. DoS interference is used 
predominantly for these attacks. These attacks can be 
applied to any server in the Internet. This issue is ade-
quately described in theliterature and different types of 
defence can be used. The safest protection measures are 
based on a hardware basis itself. All these solutions are 
rather expensive; therefore their use is seldom to be found 
with simple experiments. [10] 
The security of remote laboratories is much more sus-
ceptible to the attack aimed at the experiment hardware. 
These attacks lead to the damaging of expensive equip-
ments resulting in a substantial financial loss. Attacks can 
be executed by the access to the servers or directly by 
sending of malicious control commands to the REs. Possi-
ble solution of this situation is to secure experiment by 
user´s name and password. However this approach is 
susceptible to eavesdropping or the user's identity confu-
sion. Therefore, it is appropriate to use an encrypted con-
nection between the user and experiment, based on 
HTTPS protocol in this case. [18] This protocol ensures a 
sufficient connection security and verification the user’s 
identity if used correctly. This solution brings some secu-
rity risks as well. There is a possibility interception of 
public keys eliminated by using certificates validated by a 
certification authority. 
We are currently involved in the administration of three 
remote laboratory located in Zlín (Tomas Bata Universi-
ty), Prague (Charle´s University; http://www.ises.info) 
and Trnava (Trnava University in Trnava; 
http://kf.truni.sk/remotelab). Their security is universally 
solved at the level of complex REs. In addition to the 
conventional security, such as antivirus and firewall, we 
implemented several other measures that may help in the 
protection of experiment framework building. Our exper-
iments create automatically so-called "log-file" where 
addresses of connected users and their activities in the 
experiment in question are automatically stored. This does 
not guarantee safety itself, but allows the detection and 
analysis of failures or malfunctions of experiments. This 
file ensures faster recovery of the service in case of out-
age. Our experiments provide security through user´s 
registration and reservation system as well, so the simul-
taneous control of the experiment by two users is exclud-
ed, allowing for the observation of the experiment run 
only. Also we have exerted considerable efforts on the 
side of RE programming to treat all undefined conditions 
of experiments that could arise from ill controlling or 
hardware failure. Our experiments are generally backed 
up by UPS power supplies, ensuring the restart and acces-
sibility after a power blackout. 
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